In short
Bertrand Russell was Wittgenstein's teacher in Cambridge from 1911 and the source of his first programme: the logical analysis of language. Wittgenstein took over Russell's logic and his theory of descriptions, but rejected his theory of types and his account of judgement, and later the whole idea of philosophy as a kind of science.
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was already famous when an intense young Austrian turned up at his rooms in Trinity College, Cambridge, in October 1911, sent there by Frege. Within a few terms Russell treated him less as a pupil than as the person who would carry on his work in logic.
What Wittgenstein took from Russell
Principia Mathematica (1910-1913), written with Alfred North Whitehead, gave him the notation and the ambition: to show that the surface grammar of a sentence can hide its real structure. The model was Russell's theory of descriptions ("On Denoting", 1905). "The present King of France is bald" seems to name someone. Analysis shows it claims that exactly one thing is King of France and that this thing is bald, so the sentence is simply false, not about a ghostly king.
Russells Verdienst ist es, gezeigt zu haben, daß die scheinbare logische Form des Satzes nicht seine wirkliche sein muß.
Russell's merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.
Tractatus 4.0031
Logical atomism, the idea that the world consists of simple facts mirrored by elementary propositions, grew out of their conversations. The picture theory is Wittgenstein's version of it.
Where they parted ways
The quarrels started early. In 1913 Wittgenstein's objections to Russell's theory of judgement were so damaging that Russell gave up the book he was writing. The Tractatus also rejects the theory of types: a good notation should make nonsense impossible to write, not forbid it with an extra rule (Tractatus 3.33-3.333). Russell's introduction to the 1922 English edition secured a publisher, but Wittgenstein felt it misunderstood the book, above all the distinction between saying and showing.
The later split ran deeper. Russell still saw philosophy as continuous with science, a hunt for general truths about logic and the world. The later Wittgenstein treated philosophical problems as confusions to be dissolved. Russell had no patience with this: in My Philosophical Development (1959) he suggested that his former pupil had grown tired of serious thinking and invented a doctrine that made it unnecessary.
A lasting debt
Russell helped in practical ways too. He examined the Tractatus as Wittgenstein's doctoral thesis in 1929, together with G. E. Moore, and in 1930 wrote the report on the new work that became Philosophical Remarks, which helped secure Wittgenstein a fellowship at Trinity. The Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Russell covers his own philosophy in depth.
Frequently asked questions
Was Wittgenstein Russell's student?
Formally yes, at Trinity College from 1911 to 1913. But within a year or two he was arguing with Russell as an equal, and his criticism changed the direction of Russell's own work.
Why did Wittgenstein dislike Russell's introduction to the Tractatus?
He thought Russell read the book as a contribution to an ideal logical language and missed its central point, the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. He agreed to the introduction mainly because it got the book published.
Sources
wittgenstein.be, “Bertrand Russell”, https://wittgenstein.be/en/philosophers/bertrand-russell/ (2026-10-20)